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Abstract
In the past two decades, the profession has expended valuable resources testing structural
change in meat demand with mixed results.  Overlooked to date is a fundamental
methodological problem that transcends all of the methods of testing for structural change.
 In this study, a formal logic framework is utilized in which methodological problems
associated with any hypothesis test can be analyzed. Within this framework, it is proven
that there is no valid test of any single hypothesis, including structural change. Because of
this result, additional criteria from the methodology literature are then used to evaluate the
literature on structural change in meat demand.
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Introduction
In the past two decades, the profession has expended valuable resources attempting to
answer the question: “What has caused the change in the pattern of meat consumption?” 
The most frequently cited explanation is a change in preferences (i.e., structural change). 
In their survey of research literature, appearing in The Economics of Meat Demand (a
compilation of studies edited by Buse), Smallwood, Haidacher, and Blaylock cite 11
studies conducted between 1982 and 1986 that reportedly tested for structural change. 
The results were mixed: seven investigations found structural change of some type and
four did not.  The general conclusions drawn from Buse’s compiled studies were: (a) The
preferred test for structural change of varying parameters is uninformative, (b) hypotheses
other than structural change should be pursued to explain the change in meat consumption,
and (c) testing for structural change is intractable.
1  While these conclusions may appear
obvious, a look at the literature since 1986 reveals that they are not obvious, and are
almost invariably ignored, as Alston and Chalfant (1991a p. 36) have observed.
Since 1986, at least 20 articles have been published that focused on testing
structural change in meat demand and 17 of these are shown in table 1.
2  Of these 17
articles, 13 found structural change and four did not.  Perhaps the most striking feature of
table 1 is the type of research that has been conducted in light of the conclusions reached
in Buse’s The Economics of Meat Demand.  First, with the exception of the nonparametric
studies and contrary to the admonitions in the Economics of Meat Demand, structural
change is most often tested by some form of a varying parameters test.  Second, most of
the alternative hypotheses put forth only alter the testing framework for structural change
(i.e., dynamic or inverse demands, measurement error, and nonparametric tests).  With2
the notable exceptions of Eales and Unnevehr (1988), McGuirk et al., and Gao and
Shonkwiler, once the structural change test is conducted within the new framework and
structural change is found, no explanation of the structural change is rigorously pursued. 
Finally, the continued attempts to test for structural change suggest that structural change
testing is not thought to be an intractable problem.  Is this research agenda indicative of a
“failure by the discipline,” as Purcell claims, or does this “failure” represent a more
fundamental problem?
This paper pursues two objectives to determine if there is a fundamental problem
associated with testing structural change in meat demand.  The first objective is to use
formal logic to develop a general framework that allows methodological problems
associated with any hypothesis test to be succinctly discussed and analyzed.  Within this
general framework it can be proven that there is no valid test of any single hypothesis,
including structural change.  The lack of a valid test for any single hypothesis is a
fundamental methodological problem that transcends all methods used to test for structural
change, and this fundamental methodological problem is not easily seen when insular
methods are pursued.  Indeed, though Alston and Chalfant (1991a, b), Chalfant and
Alston, and McGuirk et al. have correctly pointed out the limitations of parametric
methods in a series of articles, the problem is more pervasive than their parametric
criticisms suggest.
   The general result that no single hypothesis is testable is well known in the
philosophy of science (i.e. methodology) literature as the ‘Duhem thesis,’ named for the
French physicist/philosopher who wrote of this problem in 1906.  Although the Duhem
thesis has been sporadically alluded to in the agricultural economics literature (e.g., Ladd;
Randall), the data in table 1 suggest that its implications are not fully acknowledged or3
appreciated.  Furthermore, in the few instances where the Duhem thesis is cited, no
discussion is provided to describe how the thesis may be addressed—which leads to the
second objective of the paper. 
The second objective of the paper is to evaluate the research in table 1 according to
criteria developed in the methodology literature that are specifically designed to address
Duhem’s thesis.  These criteria must be considered in addition to standard methods of
theory testing (e.g. statistical testing) because Duhem’s thesis undermines the standard
methods of theory testing.  The general conclusion drawn from this evaluation is that
while only five of the 17 articles listed in table 1 satisfy all of the additional criteria, 13 of
the 17 articles satisfy some of the additional criteria.  Thus there does not appear to be a
“failure by the discipline,” but there is room for improvement.
The paper makes three contributions to the literature.  First, the paper provides the
methodological foundations for the conclusions reached in The Economics of Meat
Demand (Buse), as well as those reported by Alston and Chalfant, and more generally, by
Bessler and Covey.  Second, the additional methodological criteria discussed here suggest
fertile research agendas in the area of meat demand.  Finally, and most importantly, the
paper provides a general framework for discussing and evaluating empirical results across
methods of analysis.
In the next section, the formal logic needed for this paper is presented.  In the
following section, the general steps for constructing a typical empirical model are laid out
along the lines of Darnell and Evans; and Kim, De Marchi, and Morgan.  This typical
empirical model then provides the foundation for the argument forms in which the
methodological analysis is carried out.  Next, additional criteria from the methodology
literature are discussed for comparing theories, followed by an evaluation, according to4
these criteria, of the studies listed in table 1.  The paper ends with a summary and
implications.
The Formal Logic of Hypothesis Testing
The difficulty in assessing the arguments for and against structural change is that there is
no general unified framework that can accommodate all the different assumptions and
methods under which the discussion can take place.  Formal logic is a language designed
specifically for such problems and, for that reason, is used extensively in the methodology
literature.  Because the focus of formal logic is on argument forms rather than specific
arguments, results obtained using a formal logic framework will apply to all arguments—
regardless of whether the testing is done with parametric, semi-parametric, or
nonparametric models.  For this reason, any perceived cost associated with understanding
the formal logic are far outweighed by the breadth of understanding it brings to the
general problem of hypothesis testing.
There are many formal logics of varying complexity; however, simple
propositional logic will suffice to demonstrate the main points of the paper.  The major
components of propositional logic required for the paper are presented in the text, while
the more specific aspects are relegated to the appendix.
Propositional logic deals with the logical relation between statements termed
propositions.  Simple propositions make a single claim, whereas complex propositions
make more than a single claim.  Propositions are then used to form arguments.  An
argument is defined as a sequence of propositions in which some propositions, called
premises, are used to support a proposition (or propositions) termed a conclusion.  In the
logic of hypothesis testing, there are two premises: the hypothesis and the test evidence. 5
The first premise is the hypothesis, which is a conditional statement.  A conditional
statement is a statement of the form ‘if f, then y,’ and is written in logical form as fﬁy.
 The symbol f is a propositional variable called the antecedent, and represents a
proposition.  The antecedent in the scientific hypothesis is usually a complex proposition,
which means it consists of many simple propositions.  The symbol y, also a propositional
variable, is termed the consequent, and represents another proposition.  The second
premise is the test evidence and may be one of two types: either the consequent y is
believed true, or not y is believed true, where not y is denoted as ~y.
3  From the
hypothesis and the test evidence, the conclusion is drawn and the argument completed.
An argument form is valid if there is no case in which the premises are true and
the conclusion false.  An argument form is invalid if the premises can be true and the
conclusion false.  A simplistic example of a valid argument is: ‘If Karl ate Chicken, then
Karl ate meat.  Karl ate Chicken.  Therefore, ‘Karl ate meat.’  When placing a specific
argument in logical form, propositional variables are replaced with propositional constants
that represent specific propositions and are usually capital letters.  The argument is then
written in logical form as (CﬁK), C |-K.  A comma is used to separate premises, and a
turnstile is used to separate premises from the conclusion.
Because the scientist is attempting to draw inference about the antecedent (f) from
the test result of the consequent (y), there are two possible argument forms that are
internally consistent:  fﬁy, y |- f or fﬁy, ~y |- ~f.  The question is then: Are these
argument forms both valid?  Since these argument forms are so common and are
thoroughly discussed in any introductory logic text, the results regarding validity are given
here as lemmas:6
LEMMA 1.  The argument form fﬁy, y |- f is invalid.
LEMMA 2.  The argument form fﬁy, ~y |- ~f is valid.
Lemma 1 is a fallacious argument form known as ‘affirming the consequent.’  Consider
the previous argument: ‘If Karl ate Chicken, then Karl ate meat.’  Suppose we are told
only that ‘Karl ate meat’ is true.  From this it would be invalid to conclude that ‘Karl ate
Chicken,’ because he may eat only beef.  So (CﬁK), K |- C is invalid.
Alternatively, Lemma 2 is known as ‘denying the consequent’ and is valid.  Note
that if we were told ‘Karl did not eat meat,’ we could correctly conclude that ‘Karl did not
eat Chicken’—so CﬁK, ~K |- ~C is valid.  Lemmas 1 and 2 capture the essence of
Popper’s falsificationist philosophy of science.  Popper pointed out that no single
experiment proves a theory (Lemma 1), but a single experiment may falsify a theory
(Lemma 2).
To prove that there is no valid argument form for a single hypothesis such as
structural change, one additional lemma is required:
LEMMA 3. (Duhem’s Thesis). Let f be the conjunction of n propositions,
written in logical form as f = (f1￿f2￿...￿fn), where each fi is called a
conjunct and represents the ith proposition.  The argument form fﬁy,
~y |- ~fi for any i is invalid.
Proof.  Refer to the appendix.
An simple example of Lemma 3 is the following argument: Let ‘if Karl eats
Chicken and Pierre eats Beef, then both Karl and Pierre eat meat’ be a simple hypothesis.
 Let ‘it is not true that both Karl and Pierre eat meat’ be the evidence.  From this
evidence it cannot be concluded, however, that either ‘Karl does not eat Chicken’ or7
‘Pierre does not eat Beef.’  It may be that Karl does eat chicken, but Pierre is a
vegetarian.  All that can be concluded is: ‘It is not the case that Karl eats Chicken and
Pierre eats Beef.’  Thus, the argument forms (C￿B)ﬁ(K￿P), ~(K￿P) |- ~C and
(C￿B)ﬁ(K￿P), ~(K￿P) |- ~B are each invalid.
Popper (1968, chpt. 3) refers to the conjunction f in a scientific setting as a
theoretical system. A theoretical system is just the conjunction of all the assumptions that
generate an empirical model.  As Lemma 3 proves, a single hypothesis within a theoretical
system is not falsifiable and this is Duhem’s thesis.  The immediate corollary to Duhem’s
thesis is that if the theoretical system is false, it may be because any subset of the
propositions or assumptions is false—but it cannot be determined which subset is false
without further information.  For this reason, philosophers of science refer to theories as
being ‘underdetermined’ (Salmon et al.).  With this formal logic background, the
arguments for testing structural change can now easily be analyzed.
Construction of a Typical Empirical Model
To employ the logical tools of the previous section, a typical argument for testing
structural change must be specified.  This can be accomplished by first constructing a
typical empirical model along the lines of Darnell and Evans.  This construction is a
specific application of the more general discussion recently given by Kim, De Marchi, and
Morgan.  After the typical empirical model is constructed, the formal methodological
analysis can begin.
Whenever empirical work is based on theoretical foundations, four types of
assumptions must be made to generate an empirical model: (a) ceteris paribus assumptions
made at the outset to restrict the range of the phenomenon under consideration (e.g.,8
institutional structure is constant); (b) theoretical conceptual assumptions that formalize
the conceptual theory and from which the implications of the theory are derived (e.g.,
quasi-concave utility function); (c) theoretical bridging assumptions that make the theory
empirically accessible (e.g., functional form); and (d) empirical bridging assumptions that
connect the empirically accessible theory to the data of interest (e.g., measurement
variables).
The term “bridging assumption” comes from Hempel and helps distinguish
between the different types of assumptions that are made in constructing a typical
empirical model.  In going from (a) to (d), no clear delineation exists between specific
assumptions, though the hierarchy of assumptions (Stewart) and general delineation
between types of assumptions is considered an accurate taxonomy.  Furthermore, there is
likely a hierarchy within each type of assumption, and it is accepted that the classification
of specific assumptions is debatable.  Because the ceteris paribus assumption in the present
context is self explanatory, attention turns directly to assumptions (b) through (d).
Theoretical Conceptual Assumptions
The standard realist assumption that there exists a representative consumer who maximizes
a classical static utility function subject to a budget constraint (which is so prevalent in the
literature) will be utilized here.  The optimization process leads to a system of theoretical
demand functions:
(1) Y* = F(X*; B),
where Y*˛R is the theoretical set of goods and services consumed by the representative
consumer, X*˛R is the theoretical set of demand determinants, F:X*ﬁY* is the ‘true’
theoretical functional form of the demand system, and B˛R
 p is the set of ‘true’ theoretical9
parameters associated with F.  All the implications of the theory are captured by the
demand system.
Theoretical Bridging Assumptions
As is well recognized, the demand system characterized by (1) is far too general to be
empirically tractable, and therefore requires two types of theoretical bridging assumptions.
 First, some type of assumption must be made to reduce the prohibitively large dimensions
of Y* and X*.  Therefore, some type of aggregation assumption (i.e., Hicks’s composite
commodity theorem or separability) or incomplete demand system assumption must be
made.  In either case, only subsets of Y* and X* are then defined as y*￿Y* and x*￿X*. 
Second, since the ‘true’ functional form is unobservable, a functional form f is chosen,
such that ƒ:x*ﬁy*.  Thus, a partial theoretical model of (1) is expressed as
(2)  y* = ƒ(x*; b),
where b˛R
 k is the set of ‘true’ model parameters.
Empirical Bridging Assumptions
Theory provides no guidelines to observational units or measurement variables; thus the
researcher is forced to assume that the theory applies to a specific observational unit and
that selected measurement variables correspond to the theoretical variables.  Let the
observational units be denoted by t, which may represent weeks, months, or years in a
time-series context, or households, states, or countries in a cross-sectional context.  Let
the measurement variables for y* and x* be denoted by y and x.  The empirical model then
becomes11
observational units t assumption, A5 = the chosen measurement variables y and x
assumption, and DS = the structural change assumption.  Clearly these conjuncts are
themselves complex propositions, as there are many specific assumptions embedded within
each one of these major headings; however, these capture the major assumptions.
The common claim in the literature is that the consequent of structural change is
varying parameters in the empirical model (3) (i.e., Db).  Following that convention, the
hypothesis of structural change would then be written in logical form as T0ﬁDb, which is
read as: ‘If all the assumptions listed are unproblematic and there is structural change,
then the parameters in the empirical model will vary.’  The alternative hypothesis of no
structural change would be similarly written and interpreted.  The available evidence from
the empirical model (3) would be either that the parameters are varying (Db) or that they
are not (~Db), but not both.  Using the lemmas, the metatheorem may now be stated.
METATHEOREM. There is no valid argument form for structural change
tests.
Proof.  There are four possible argument forms: (i) T0ﬁDb, Db |- DS;
(ii) T1ﬁ~Db, ~Db  |- ~DS; (iii) T0ﬁDb, ~Db |- ~DS; and (iv) T1ﬁ~Db, Db |- DS. 
By Lemma 1, arguments (i) and (ii) are invalid.  By Lemma 2, it is valid to conclude for
arguments (iii) and (iv) that ~T0 and ~T1 are true, but it is invalid by Lemma 3 to
conclude in argument (iii) that ~DS is true, or in argument (iv) that DS is true.
As the metatheorem demonstrates, even if all of the parameters of a model were
known with certainty, there is still no valid test of structural change.  The only valid test
is of a theoretical system.  More explicitly stated, there is no valid test of structural
change, only a test of the conjunction of the ceteris paribus assumptions, the theoretical12
conceptual assumptions, the dimension reduction assumptions, the functional form
assumption, the observational units assumption, the measurement variables assumption and
the structural change assumption.
While it would seem the metatheorem result should be obvious and well known,
table 1 indicates otherwise.  As Alston and Chalfant (1991a p. 36) have stated in their
parametric analysis: “That results are therefore always conditional on specification choices
is equally obvious but almost invariably ignored...This is noticeably so in the large
number of recent studies of structural change in the demand for meat.”  Because the result
holds even in the hypothetical situation of the parameters being known with certainty, it
also implies that even if all econometric assumptions were diagnosed as satisfactory as
advocated by McGuirk, et al. there would still be no valid test of structural change.  What
is clearly demonstrated here by the metatheorem is that the results extend beyond
parametric models.  Even if a nonparametric technique is used and no functional form is
assumed, there is still no valid test of structural change.  In fact, the metatheorem applies
to all hypothesis testing.  There is no proof or disproof of a single hypothesis.  Thus, the
scientist is caught in what may be termed the Popper-Duhem dilemma: While Popper’s
falsification criteria is the only logically correct way to test a theory, Duhem’s thesis
nullifies falsification of a single hypothesis.
Additional Methodological Criteria
The metatheorem, or Popper-Duhem dilemma, is the central reason why there is presently
no consensus in the philosophy of science literature.  From the Popper-Duhem dilemma, it
is clear that any subset of the assumptions could be altered such that the theoretical system13
would not be falsified.  Thus the researcher who believes there has been no structural
change can always claim the finding of structural change is because one of the other
assumptions in the theoretical system is incorrect (e.g. the dimension reduction assumption
is problematic or the functional form assumption is problematic or the selected
measurement variables are problematic).  The researcher can therefore reconsider any
assumption(s), that initially may have been considered correct or innocuous, in order to
generate a new theoretical system (T1) that may not be falsified.  This process of
reconsidering assumptions that initially were assumed true by default is known as
diagnostic reasoning.  (Janssen and Tan provide an introduction and case study of
diagnostic reasoning in economics.)  Thus, the researcher can be seen as diagnosing which
component of the theoretical system needs to be adjusted to explain the falsification or
‘anomaly.’  The relevant methodological question becomes: How are alternative diagnoses
to be critically evaluated?  This is the problem addressed by Lakatos.
4
Lakatos retains Popper’s notion of science by accepting a theory as scientific only
if there is an empirical basis.  The empirical basis is the set of potential falsifiers, i.e., the
set of those observational propositions which may disprove (p. 98).  However,
recognizing that Duhem’s thesis allows the scientist to alter any assumption, and therefore
create a new theoretical system T1 in an attempt to avoid falsification, Lakatos defines a
theoretical system (T0) as falsified if and only if another theoretical system (T1) has been
proposed with the following characteristics:
5 (a) T1 has excess content over T0 by
predicting novel facts that are improbable or even forbidden by T0; (b) T1 explains the
previous success of T0, and all the unrefuted content of T0 is included in the content of T0;
and (c) some of the excess content of T1 is corroborated.14
If the alternative theoretical system T1 satisfies (a) and (b), then there is theoretical
progress.  If all three conditions are satisfied, there is empirical progress.  De Marchi (p.
134) points out that Lakatos identifies another type of progress, which will be termed
empirical basis refinement (Lakatos, p. 121, footnote 4).  Empirical basis refinement
occurs when the technique for testing a theory is altered in a manner that provides a more
accurate and appropriate test of the theory.  Consider a simple example of these concepts.
 Let an original theoretical system specify a linear demand function but a new theoretical
system specify a quadratic demand function.  The quadratic specification would possesses
empirical basis refinement because hypothesis testing occurs within a more general
framework.  The quadratic specification is theoretically progressive because it would
predict an interaction effect that is forbidden by the linear specification.  The quadratic
specification would also be empirically progressive if the significance of the interaction
terms was corroborated.  In the process of evaluating a diagnosis, there are then three
types of progress to consider: theoretical, empirical, and empirical basis refinement.
Methodological Appraisal of the Literature
Within the general methodological framework presented, the diagnosis that there has been
a change in preferences (i.e., structural change) is clearly only one of an infinite number
of diagnoses that could account for the changing pattern of meat consumption.  The
studies cited in table 1 emphasized seven diagnoses to account for this change: (a) a
change in preferences, (b) measurement error, (c) inverse demand, (d) nonparametrics  (e)
dynamics, (f) separability, and (g) causal factors.  Based on the methodological criteria set
out in the previous sections, these seven approaches now can be critically evaluated
according to how many of the criteria they satisfy.15
The first diagnosis of changing preferences (Al-Kahtani and Badr El-din; Anderson
and Goddard; Choi and Sosin; Moschini and Meilke), is the least progressive of all
diagnoses because it is not theoretically or empirically progressive and it does not refine
the empirical basis.  The major shortcoming of this diagnosis is that changing preferences
are claimed to be captured by varying parameters.  The metatheorem clearly indicates that
regardless of functional form, data, or any specification choice, varying parameters are
neither necessary nor sufficient for changing preferences.  While researchers often
acknowledge this fact, most studies go on to infer from changing parameters that there is
structural change.  Given that this inferential procedure seems to have become pervasive
within the profession, assume momentarily that it is valid and let us see if it withstands
closer methodological scrutiny.
Closer methodological scrutiny requires answering the question: “Does stable
preference theory disallow varying parameters in an empirical model?”  The answer to
this question is no.  Stable preference theory also permits varying parameters in a
parametric model and therefore the changing preference assumption does not account for
any result that is not also accounted for by the stable preference assumption.  Hence, the
assumption that changing preferences are causing the varying parameters represents no
theoretical or empirical progress over the stable preference theory.  But, let us weaken the
argument still further and suppose this is not the case.  That is, suppose that varying
parameters do indicate changing preferences.  Does the fact that preferences are changing
possess any excess content?  Perhaps, but very little.  The key question science seeks to
answer is “why?”  Knowing there has been a change in preference is an example of
descriptive knowledge, but growth in science comes from explanatory knowledge
(Salmon).  Explanatory knowledge is achieved by identifying causal factors, and it is from16
this identification that excess content can be generated.  Therefore, a more progressive
approach is one in which the factors causing the parameters to change (i.e., the so-called
changing preferences) are identified and incorporated in the analysis. 
From table 1, the studies focusing on measurement error, inverse demand systems,
and nonparametrics are all examples of diagnoses that are progressive, but only in terms
of refining the empirical basis.  A diagnosis that a variable is incorrectly measured
(Atkins, Kerr, and McGivern) represents no theoretical or empirical progress because
there is no improbable novel fact associated with the new measurement that was not also
associated with the old measurement.  However, using a more appropriate measurement
variable clearly tightens the correspondence between the theory and the empirical model,
and therefore is progressive because it refines the empirical basis.
The studies listed under the heading inverse demand systems (Eales and Unnevehr
1993; Dahlgran 1987, 1988; Thurman) question the default assumption that prices are
exogenous, and instead propose that perhaps quantities are exogenous.  As these authors
discuss, this is an issue dealing with the difference between a representative agent theory
and a market theory where supply may not be perfectly elastic at the market level.  With
regard to demand behavior, there is nothing theoretically or empirically progressive about
altering this assumption because the price-dependent form predicts nothing improbable or
forbidden by the quantity-dependent form.  However, this approach is   progressive from
the standpoint of refining the empirical basis because, until supply is correctly accounted
for, tests for varying parameters may be misleading.
Because the choice of functional form is always debatable, the studies classified as
nonparametric (Burton and Young 1991; Chalfant and Alston; Sakong and Hayes) offer an
alternative way of testing certain assumptions or hypotheses.  Structural change is17
supposedly tested using nonparametric techniques to observe periods in which violations of
optimizing behavior occur.  However, as shown by the metatheorem, even if the default
assumption regarding the functional form specification is removed, the argument form for
claiming a nonparametric method test for structural change is still invalid.  It could be
argued that a nonparametric method actually represents a degenerative approach relative to
a parametric approach because the former has less empirical content than the latter (e.g.,
no elasticity estimates).  But because the nonparametric approach relaxes a rather stringent
default assumption (i.e., a specific functional form), it is progressive because it refines the
empirical basis.
Because static theory can be considered nested within dynamic theory, the dynamic
specifications (Burton and Young 1992; Chen and Veeman) refine the empirical basis. 
The dynamic specifications also represent theoretical and empirical progress because they
allow for lagging and leading variables to influence consumption, which is not captured by
static models.  Similarly, considering alternative separability conditions (Eales and
Unnevehr 1988) and, hence, product aggregation schemes, refines the empirical basis
because a more appropriate theoretical framework is used for conducting the hypothesis
test.  Considering more appropriate aggregation schemes also produces excess content in
the form of different cross-price and expenditure relationships.
The only studies in table 1 that consider causal factors for the so-called structural
change are Gao and Shonkwiler; and McGuirk et al.  Where the other studies only
speculate that changes in nutrition concepts or demographics may explain the observations
of varying parameters, Gao and Shonkwiler; and McGuirk et al. proceed to incorporate
some of these causal factors into the model.  Because their general empirical approach is
consistent with a more general theory of demand and they attempt to answer the “why”18
question, these studies must be considered the most progressive of all the approaches
because they are both theoretically and empirically progressive.  The incorporation of
these other variables generates theoretical and empirical excess content over all other
models.  Furthermore, because the hypothesis is considered in this more general
framework, the empirical basis is refined in both studies.
Summary and Implications
The first objective of this paper was to develop a general logical framework that allows
methodological problems associated with any hypothesis test to be succinctly discussed and
analyzed.  This objective was easily achieved by employing some formal logic, and it was
proven that there is no valid test of any single hypothesis, including structural change. 
Given this result, the second objective was to appeal to the methodology literature for
additional criteria for evaluating the research on structural change in terms of its progress.
 The criteria used were those proposed by Lakatos related to theoretical progress,
empirical progress, and empirical basis refinement.  The 17 articles in table 1 addressing
structural change in meat demand were appraised based on how many of these criteria
were satisfied.  Four of the articles did not satisfy any of these criteria, eight of the
articles satisfied only the empirical basis refinement criterion and five of the articles
satisfied all three criteria.  However, of the five articles that satisfied all three criteria, the
articles by Gao and Shonkwiler, and McGuirk, et al. specifically incorporated the factors
that were speculated by other articles as inducing the so called structural change, and for
this reason, are the most progressive of the 17 articles.
The implications of this methodological appraisal indicate that utilization of a more
generalized demand framework is a progressive approach to pursue for future research.  A19
generalized demand framework recognizes that an indirect utility function is a function of
many other variables, in addition to contemporaneous prices and expenditures.  While
generalized demand functions can be generated in several ways, perhaps the two most
common are either through translating and scaling variables or through household
production theory.  (Lewbel demonstrates a very general procedure for incorporating other
variables into a demand function.)  The generalized demand approach produces substantial
excess content over the classical approach because it can account for so many phenomena
not addressed by the standard demand theory, thereby achieving substantial theoretical and
empirical progress.  Furthermore, this approach refines the empirical basis because the
hypothesis is cast in a more general and appropriate framework.  (Examples of such
analysis would be Jorgenson and Slesnick, or Gao and Spreen.)  This conclusion is in
agreement with Buse’s ‘alternative hypotheses’ recommendation, and is supported by the
conclusions of other studies (Haidacher; Wohlgenant; Capps and Schmitz) seeking to
explain the change in meat consumption.
Until now, no methodological foundations have been offered to support the three
general conclusions drawn in Buse’s The Economics of Meat Demand: (a) The preferred
test for structural change of varying parameters is uninformative, (b) hypotheses other
than structural change should be pursued to explain the change in meat consumption, and
(c) testing for structural change is intractable.  By providing the methodological
foundations for these conclusions, hopefully these points will no longer be overlooked.20
Appendix
Because formal logic may be unfamiliar to some, this appendix summarizes the rules of
propositional logic needed to prove Lemma 3.  A more thorough treatment of
propositional logic can be found in any introductory logic textbook (Nolt is followed
here).  There are two aspects of any formal logic: the syntax and the semantics.
Syntax for Propositional Logic
Formulas in propositional logic are constructed from four sets of characters:
   1. Propositional constants—capital letters used to symbolize a proposition.
   2. Logical operators—symbols denoting connectives (~ for negation, ￿ for
conjunction, and ﬁ for conditional).
   3. Brackets—symbols to separate formulas, {[()]}.
   4. Numerals—positive integers to subscript sentence letters.
From this character set, the formation rules for propositional logic define a well-formed
formula.  The formation rules for propositional logic needed here are:
   1. Any propositional constant is a formula.
   2. If f is a formula, then ~f is a formula.
   3. If f and y are formulas, then so are (f￿y) and (fﬁy).
From the character set and the formation rules, complex propositions or arguments may be
formed.21
Semantics for Propositional Logic
The central concept in the semantics of a logic is truth value.  If a formula f is true, its
truth value is denoted as u(f) = T.  If f is false, its truth value is denoted as u(f) = F. 
For any formula f and y, and for any valuation u, there are valuation rules.  The
valuation rules relevant for this paper are:
  (i) u(~f) = T iff u(f) = F,
u(~f) = F iff u(f) = T;
  (ii) u(f￿y) = T iff u(f) = T and u(y) = T,
u(f￿y) = F if either u(f) = F or u(y) = F;
  (iii) u(fﬁy) = T if either u(f) = F or u(y) = T,
u(fﬁy) = F iff u(f) = T and u(y) = F.
Because interest here lies in valid versus invalid arguments, validity must be defined:
DEFINITION 1. An argument form is valid if there is no valuation on which
its premises are true and its conclusion is false.
DEFINITION 2. A form is invalid if there is at least one valuation on which
its premises are true and its conclusion is false.
Proof of Lemma 3.  To prove invalidity requires showing one valuation in which
the premises are true and the conclusion is false.  The premise ~y is taken as given
evidence, i.e., u(~y) = T.  Without a loss of generality, let n = 2, u(f1) = F, and
u(f2) = T.  From valuation rule (ii), it follows that u(f) = u[(f1￿f2)] = F, and so from
valuation rule (iii), u[(f1￿f2)ﬁ y] = T.  By valuation rule (ii), it follows that the premise
is true, i.e., u{[(f1￿f2)ﬁ y]￿~y} = T, however the conclusion ~f2 is not true because
u(f2) = T, and by valuation rule (i), u(~f2) = F, and so the invalidity is demonstrated.22
Footnotes
1 These points are made several places in Buse’s The Economics of Meat Demand
(pp. 14–16, 54, 95, 103, 113, 128, and 202).
2 After this article was completed an additional number of articles came out
continuing to address this issue.  The more prominent ones are Cortez and Senauer, and
the special issue of the European Review of Agricultural Economics edited by Michael
Burton and Kyrre Rickertsen, which was entitled “Analysing Consumer Behavior and
Structural Change in Food Demand.”  This special issue contained eight articles that
addressed in some form or fashion the issue of structural change.
3 It is recognized that a scientist may not believe either of these.  The possibility is
easily considered with a three-valued logic, but the added complexity of considering a
three-valued logic will not change the major point of the paper.
4 Lakatos’ methodology is considered to be rather pragmatic.  As Blaug (p. 32)
observes, the Lakatos methodology is not as rigid and prescriptive as the naive version of
Popper’s falsification school, whereby a single hypothesis can be refuted by a falsifying
instance.  But it is more rigid and prescriptive than Kuhn’s descriptive and historical
account of science.  For this reason, it is not surprising that Lakatos is criticized from both
sides.  Philosophers of science reproach him for not providing a solid demarcation
principle between science and nonscience; alternatively, historians criticize Lakatos for not
describing the scientific process accurately.  Given that practicing economists are neither
philosophers of science nor historians, they may take from Lakatos those aspects of his
methodology that are recognized as advantageous and leave the rest (Cross).  This23
approach may be referred to as a “local provisional methodology” (Randall).
5 Popper (1992), Van Fraasen, and Pietroski and Rey have proposed similar
criteria.24
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